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The Sugar Mill Case: Public Waste and the Public Bid
Law
"Lord Polonius: What do you read my lord?
"Hamlet: Words, words, words."'
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I. THE LACASSINE SYRUP MILL

A series of reports published in 2006 on the construction of a
45 million dollar syrup mill in Lacassine, Louisiana made
Agriculture Commissioner Bob Odom out to be a sweet-toothed
robber baron eager to exploit local farmers and taxpayers for more
sugar money. 2 The Louisiana Department of Agriculture and
Forestry built the Lacassine mill to help sugarcane farmers cope
with rising trucking costs. 3 The mill condenses cane stalks into
syrup, which allows more sugar to fit into each load, and offers a
4
rail spur for bulk shipments to refineries in New Iberia.
Financing for the mill's construction came from state bonds
5
secured by an annual $12 million in gambling taxes.
Commissioner Odom planned to recoup the mill's cost by selling
the mill to a nonprofit farmer's cooperative. 6 The farmers would
use profits from the mill's operations to pay off the bonds, thereby
shifting the construction costs off taxpayers.
Critics of the Department's efforts regarded the facility as an
irresponsible waste of tax money. The credit sale to farmers did
not soothe fears that the mill would fail to generate profits without
significant increases in cane production. 8 If the mill failed, bond
holders would be entitled to the gambling money to repay the
debt. 9 The project's speculative benefits coupled with the vast

2. See Editorial, A Sweetener for Odom Mill, THE ADVOCATE (Baton

Rouge) July 30, 2006, at B8; see generally Laura Maggi, State-Built Cane Syrup
Mill Gets More FinancialHelp, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 20, 2006,
National, at 2.
3. Laura Maggi, Sugar Mill Now to Open Just Before Season Ends, TIMES
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 30, 2005, National, at 2.
4.

Id. See also Laura Maggi, Sugar Cane Farmers to Take Possession of

State Syrup Mill, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 16, 2006, National, at 4.
5. Maggi, supra note 2.
6. Laura Maggi, Odom Gets OK to Seek Sugar Mill Sale: PotentialBuyers
Not Disclosed,TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 26, 2006, National, at 2.

7. See id,
8. Maggi, supra note 2. For Commissioner Odom's response to public
criticism of the Lacassine sugar mill, see Bob Odom, Letter to the Editor, Syrup
Plant Is Not a Waste, Commissioner Says, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans),

Feb. 3, 2006, Metro, at 6.
9. Maggi, supra note 4.
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amount of money involved led
some to suspect the Commissioner
0
was engaged in self-dealing. 1
Suspicions were no doubt heightened after the Commissioner
announced he had changed his mind about selling the mill to the
farmer's co-op. "1Under the new plan, the mill would be offered to
unidentified outside investors while the co-op would receive a
lease. 12 Odom claimed the unknown investors were offering as
3
much as $60 million to buy the facility.'
While the media was busy coloring the Commissioner as the
sugar king of south Louisiana, no one was paying attention to the
legal problems looming in the background. In building the
Lacassine mill, the Department of Agriculture and Forestry
ignored the Public Bid Law. 14 Under the law, state agencies must
advertise public works contracts and award them to the lowest
responsible bidder.'5 No bids were ever solicited for the Lacassine
mill.
Commissioner Odom acted as the project's general
contractor. 16 Under Odom's direction, firemen and office clerks
who worked for the Department of Agriculture and Forestry
furnished labor for the mill's construction. 17 For specialized
projects, the Commissioner hand-picked the contractors.I
On behalf of its members, Louisiana Associated General
Contractors challenged the Commissioner's authority to run the
project. The association sued for an injunction ordering the

10. Henry M. Mouton, Letter to the Editor, Why Is Odom Afraid of Public
Bid Law?, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), May 12, 2005, at B6. See also
Editorial, supra note 2; Michelle Millhollon, Mill to Benefit Hines; He Says It's
Not Conflict, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Nov. 30, 2006, at Al (discussing
possible conflicts of interests in a sugar mill to be built after the Lacassine mill
in Bunkie, Louisiana).
11. Maggi, supra note 6.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38:2211-26 (2007).
15. Id. § 38:2212(A)(1)(a).
16. See Maggi, supra note 6.
17.

Id.

18. See id.; Will Sentell, Sugar Mill Safety Problems Outlined: 17 Injuries
Cited, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Apr. 1, 2005, at Al (discussing the safety
hazards at the Lacassine construction site found by the Office of Risk
Management).
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Commissioner and others to comply with the Public Bid Law. 19 In
response, the Commissioner answered that the Agricultural
Finance Act exempted him from compliance.2 ° The trial court
ruled for the Commissioner and the Louisiana First Circuit Court
of Appeal affirmed. 2 '
The first circuit treated the case purely as an issue of statutory
construction and made no attempt to address the substantive
policies that underlie the Public Bid Law. 22
In Louisiana
Associated General Contractors v. Louisiana Department of
Agriculture and Forestry (the Sugar Mill Case), the Louisiana
Supreme Court reviewed the first circuit's decision.23
The
supreme court unanimously affirmed the first circuit's decision,
but shockingly, Justice Victory's opinion did nothing to develop
the lower courts' rationale. Instead, the 24
high court adopted the first
interpretation.
circuit's "plain meaning"
After the supreme court's decision, the fate of millions of tax
dollars and an enlargement of the Agriculture Commissioner's
powers were decided by consideration of nothing more than the
words on a page.
This note analyzes the far-reaching
consequences of the court's decision. Part II of this note describes
the case and the Public Bid Law in more detail. Part III
demonstrates why the court's plain meaning approach fails to
provide an adequate solution under accepted principles of law and
linguistics. Part IV concludes with an alternative analysis and a
proposal to abolish the intra-agency borrowing of bid law
exemptions.

19. See La. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Dep't of Agric. & Forestry
(Associated Contractors), 897 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2004), aff'd, 924
So. 2d 90 (La. 2006).
20. See id. at 701.
21. Id. at 702.
22. See id.
23. 924 So. 2d 90 (La. 2006).
24. Id. at 103-04. Justice Johnson concurred in the opinion without
assigning reasons.
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II. INTO THE CANE FIELD

A. The Public Bid Law
The Louisiana Public Bid Law lays out procedural and
substantive rules that govern the awarding of public works
contracts. The legislature adopted the Public Bid Law to insulate
public funds from fraud and official malfeasance.25 The law
achieves this end by requiring competitive bidding for a wide
range of public activities and by limiting the discretion of officials
to reject bids.26 The Public Bid Law provides fairness to
contractors and increases transparency. 27
Together these
mechanisms drive down the cost of financing public works and
reduce the ability of officials to line the pockets of favored
campaign28contributors by passing exorbitant public contracts under
the table.
The Public Bid Law requires all public entities to advertise the
undertaking of public works over $100,000 and to award the
project to the "lowest responsible bidder" who bids in accordance
with the project's specifications. 29 "Public entities" subject to the
statute include "any agency, board, commission, department,... or
any political subdivision of the state." 30 Generally, public officers
also qualify as "public entities."'31 The term "public works"
includes the "construction, alteration, improvement, or repair of
any public facility 32
or immovable property owned, used, or leased
by a public entity."
Advertisements soliciting bids for public contracts must be
published at least once a week in a local newspaper. 33 The
25. Id. at 95.
26. New Orleans Rosenbush Claims Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 653
So. 2d 538, 543 (La. 1995). Although limited, local authorities retain some
discretion. See La. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Calcasieu Parish Sch. Bd., 586
So. 2d 1354, 1363 (La. 1991).
27. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38:2212 (2007); J.W. Rombach, Inc. v.
Parish of Jefferson, 670 So. 2d 1305, 1310-11 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996).
28. J.W. Rombach, 670 So. 2d at 1310.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

§ 38:2212(A)(1).
§ 38:2211(A)(1 1).
Id.
§ 38:2211(A)(12).
§ 38:2212(A)(3)(a).
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advertisements must run for at least three weeks and must come at
least twenty-five days before bids are eligible for receipt.34 The
successful bidder must sign a contract with the public entity and in
most cases must provide a bond for security. 35 Any contract
awarded without following these procedures is an absolute
nullity. 36 Local district attorneys and the attorney general have
authority under the act to sue for nullification of contracts awarded
The act also
without complying with these procedures. 37
authorizes citizens'
suits against public entities that disregard the
38
Public Bid Law.
Public entities also face substantive limits on the award of
public contracts. Public entities must award public works contracts
to the "lowest responsible bidder." 39 The responsible bidder
4
standard is designed to make contract awards less discretionary. 0
Traditionally, public entities were entitled to reject any and all
bids. 4 1 The government could then readvertise the project.42 To
end this practice, the legislature amended the law to require a just
cause for rejection.43 The just cause standard diminishes the
discretion available to public officials under prior law, but does not
eliminate it. Officials make the initial determination as to which
bidders qualify as "responsible. '"44 The Public Bid Law expressly
allows officials to consider available funding for the project and
45
changes in the project's scope in making their determination.

34. Id.
35. § 38:2216(A)(1).
36. § 38:2220(A).
37. § 38:2220(B).
38. § 38:2220.1 (authorizing civil actions under sections 2220.1 to 2220.4).

39. § 38:2212(A)(1)(a).

40. New Orleans Rosenbush Claims Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 653
So. 2d 538, 544 (La. 1995).
41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:2214 (1983) (current version at LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 38:2214 (2007)).
42. W.R. Aldrich & Co. v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Rapides Parish,
114 So. 2d 860 (La. 1959).
43. § 38:2214(B). See also New Orleans Rosenbush Claims Serv., Inc., 653
So. 2d at 541-42 (discussing the 1982 legislative mistake and subsequent 1983
amendments).
44. See Broadmoor, L.L.C. v. Ernest N. Morial New Orleans Exhibition
Hall Auth., 867 So. 2d 651, 656 (La. 2004) (noting that "lowest responsible
bidder" is not equivalent to "lowest monetary bid").
45. § 38:2214(B).
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Louisiana jurisprudence permits public officials to consider the
contractor's financial stability, experience, and reputation.46
The jurisprudence has so far treated the responsible bidder
issue as a question of good faith.47 In New Orleans Rosenbush
Claims Service, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, Rosenbush Claims
Service was the low bidder on a public service contract advertised
by the City of New Orleans. 48 The City decided to reject all bids
and readvertise the project. 49 The City's position was that
readvertisement was in the public's best interest.50 Under prior
law, this explanation would have sufficed, but in Rosenbush, the
City's conclusory assertions failed to meet the just cause
standard. 5 1 By contrast, in C.R. Kirby Contractors,Inc. v. City of
Lake Charles, the third circuit upheld the City's rejection of bids
on a road patching deal based on the City's good faith assertion
that it wanted to prevent bid shopping among subcontractors.5 2
Other decisions have upheld rejections based on5 4the state's
finances, 53 and the use of unacceptable subcontractors.
Underlying the need for the Public Bid Law is concern about
human greed. Government officials have a perverse incentive to
spend public funds in ways that maximize the benefits to
themselves. Public servants could be tempted to hire friends,
family, or constituents at premiums that fail to reflect the value of
their services to the taxpayer. The choice makes perfect sense
from the perspective of the public servant because the benefits to
the favored individuals are directly apparent whereas the damage
to the taxpayer is imperceptible.

46. Broadmoor, 867 So. 2d at 656.
47. See J.W. Rombach, Inc. v. Parish of Jefferson, 670 So. 2d 1305, 1311
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1996).
48. New Orleans Rosenbush Claims Serv., Inc., 653 So. 2d at 540.
49. Id. at 540-41.
50. Id. at 540.
51. See id. at 546-47.
52. 606 So. 2d 952, 955 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
53. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Standard Constr. Co. of Ga., 550 So. 2d
1327, 1333 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
54. Pyro Incinerator & Supply Corp. v. Gervais F. Favrot Co., 210 So. 2d
356, 360 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968). However, the 1982 amendments to the
Public Bid Law cast doubt on the case's holding.
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The legislature enacted the Public Bid Law to resolve this
conflict of interest in favor of taxpayers. 55 The law favors a policy
of openness and accountability to minimize the risk of surreptitious
deals diluting the public trust.56 In the Sugar Mill Case,
Commissioner Bob Odom took the Public Bid Law head-on. After
months of controversy in the news, the events culminated before
the Louisiana Supreme Court.
B. The Sugar Mill Case
The Sugar Mill Case involved more than one mill in Southwest
Louisiana. Louisiana Associated General Contractors 57 challenged
numerous projects undertaken by the Department. 58 Most of the
projects were carried out through the Louisiana Agricultural
Finance Authority, 59 a subdivision of the Department of
Agriculture and Forestry. The projects included the construction
61
of airplane hangars, tree irrigation systems, and office facilities.
The Finance Authority carried out the projects on behalf of the
Department of Agriculture
and Forestry as well as other public and
62
private entities.
Since the parties stipulated the facts before trial, the only
question before the court in the Sugar Mill Case was the statute's
proper interpretation. 63 The case turned on whether the Finance
Authority had a statutory exemption from the Public Bid Law's
competitive bidding procedures.64 If the law did provide an
exemption, the court also had to decide whether the Agriculture
Commissioner could borrow that exemption to65 carry out projects
for the Department of Agriculture and Forestry.

55. See La. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Dep't of Agric. & Forestry (Sugar
Mill Case), 924 So. 2d 90 (La. 2006).
56. Id.
57. Hereinafter referred to as the Contractors.
58. Sugar Mill Case, 924 So. 2d at 94 nn.2-4.
59. Hereinafter referred to as the Finance Authority.
60. See Sugar Mill Case, 924 So. 2d at 94-95.
61. Id. at 93.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 94.
64. Id. at 91.
65. Id.
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1. The FinanceAuthority Exemption: The Death Knell of Plain
Meaning
Both lower courts applied the rules of statutory construction to
resolve the issue. Their reasoning relied heavily on the "plain
meaning rule." 66 The Department of Agriculture and Forestry
claimed the exemption pursuant to section 266 of the Louisiana
Finance Authority Act. This section gives the Finance Authority
the power to:
Acquire or contract to acquire from any person, firm,
corporation, municipality, federal or state agency, by grant,
purchase, or otherwise, movable or immovable property or
any interest therein; own, hold, clear, improve, lease,
construct, or rehabilitate, and sell, invest, assign, exchange,
transfer, convey, lease, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of
or encumber the same, subject to the rights of holders of the
bonds of the Authority,6 7 at public or private sale, with or
without public bidding.
The Department argued that the "with or without public
bidding" clause at the end of the paragraph operates to exempt the
Finance Authority from the Public Bid Law as to all of the
enumerated powers. 68 The Contractors contended that the final
clause applies only to the conveyance of property "at public or
private sale." 69 According to the Contractors, the "logical
extension" of the Department's argument would lead to
nonsensical constructions. 70 As the Contractors stated in their
brief: "[S]eparating 'without public bidding' from 'at public or
private sale' and engrafting it to all of the listed powers confounds
reason. For example, [the Finance
Authority] cannot own or hold
71
bidding.",
public
property without
66. See La. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Dep't of Agric. & Forestry
(Associated Contractors),897 So. 2d 699, 701 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2004).
67. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:266 (14) (2007).
68. See Original Brief on Behalf of Louisiana Associated General
Contractors Inc., at 5-6, Sugar Mill Case, 924 So. 2d 90 (No. 2003-CA-2501)
[hereinafter LACG Original Brief].
69. Id.at 15.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Writing for the first circuit in the opinion below, Judge
"We
Fitzsimmons rejected the contractors' argument. 72
particularly note that the use of the conjunctive 'and' between the
clauses ... logically connects those clauses," the court announced.
"A literal reading of this fundamentally unambiguous statute
results in application of the words 'without bidding' to all of the
powers listed . ... ,73
The supreme court refused to break new ground. It too intoned
the canons of construction over section 266 and proceeded with an
analysis composed more of conclusions than reasons.74 First, the
court rejected the contractors' argument that the statutory language
had to name the Public Bid Law to create an exemption from its
procedures. 75 The court relied on Arnold v. Board of Levee
Commissionersfor the Orleans Levee District.76 According to the
court, Arnold means the statute does not have to use "magic
words" to create an exemption. 77 Arnold was a taxpayer suit under
the Louisiana Public Lease Law against the Orleans levee board
for leasing public property to house a museum and library named
after a congressman. 78 The levee board claimed an exemption
under a statute authorizing leases "under such terms and conditions
...as [the] Board may deem proper. ' 79 Although this statute was
not part of the Public Lease Law, the court held that the provision
sufficed to exempt the Orleans Parish Levee Board from the Public
Lease Law. 80 According to the court, the language showed the
legislature's intention to live levee boards broad discretion to
dispose of reclaimed lands.
Arnold sets a low standard for the degree of specificity needed
for an exemption to laws such as the Public Bid Law. The statute
containing the purported exemption in Arnold was a codification of
the powers of levee boards taken from the Louisiana Constitution
72. La. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Dep't of Agric. & Forestry (Associated
Contractors), 897 So. 2d 699, 701 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2004).
73. Id.
74. Sugar Mill Case, 924 So. 2d at 98.
75. Id.
76. 366 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1978).
77. Sugar Mill Case, 924 So. 2d at 98.
78. Arnold, 366 So. 2d at 1323.
79. Id. at 1325.
80. Id. at 1326.
81. Id.
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The statute was probably drafted without any
of 1921.82
consideration of its effect on the Public Lease Law's applicability.
If the threshold is properly expressed in Arnold, the interpretation
of exemptions would be subject to a rational basis standard. Such
a permissive standard seems inappropriate in this context since the
legislature's intent in enacting the Public Bid Law was to resolve
questionable issues in favor of taxpayers. In relying on Arnold, the
supreme court overlooked this fundamental aspect of the law.
After considering Arnold, the court analyzed section 266. The
court's reasoning adopted the lower court's plain meaning
analysis. 83 The court only added that the comma separating "at
public bidding" made
public or private sale" from "with or without
84
the contractors' interpretation absurd.
The court bolstered its construction with other statutes related
to section 266. The statute authorizing the Finance Authority to
use public employees and equipment to perform public work
"notwithstanding any other law" was particularly significant to the
court since the law presupposes the agency has not let the contract
to a private agency. 85 A similar argument was founded on section
2212, which prohibits constructions of the law that "reduce" the
powers of the Authority. 86 The court closed its analysis of the first
issue with87a discussion of other contracting laws that exempt the
Authority.

After weaving all of these arguments together in support of its
conclusion, the court struggled to successfully argue that any
reading of section 266 inevitably leads to the conclusion that the
Finance Authority need not comply with the proper bidding
procedures. The substantive analysis of the related statutes is
undercut by the absence of any justification as to why these other
82. See id. at 1325.
83. La. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. La. Dep't of Agric. & Forestry (Sugar
Mill Case), 924 So. 2d 90, 98-99 (La. 2006).
84. Id. at 98. By the court's rules of grammar, a comma used in such a
fashion "negates the 'general rule ... that relative and qualifying clauses are to
be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding."' Id. at 98-99
(quoting State v. Bums, 699 So. 2d 1179, 1181 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997)).
85. Id. at 99.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 101. In particular, the supreme court notes that the lower courts
have held that section 266 exempts the Finance Authority from the Contractors
Licensing Law. Id.
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statutes are competent indicators of the Public Bid Law's meaning.
By the end of the discussion, we are left with little more than the
court's conclusions of meaning rather than any sound legal
reasoning.
2. Taking Candyfrom a Baby: Borrowing the Finance
Authority 's Exemption
Having concluded that the Finance Authority is exempt from
the Public Bid Law, the court considered whether the
Commissioner lawfully exercised that exemption on behalf of the
Department of Agriculture and Forestry. The court approached the
issue carefully: "[C]learly there is no express exemption for the
Department or the Commissioner," said the court. 88 "[A]nd their
powers and authorities are broader than those of [the Finance
Authority]., 89 To solve the issue, the court turned to a structural
analysis.
The structural relationships among the parties in the Sugar Mill
Case arose from a weave of statutory and constitutional law. The
Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry is a
constitutional entity organized within the executive branch of
government.
The Commissioner of Agriculture heads the
department. 9' The constitution charges the Commissioner with the
regulation of produce, livestock, farming, and other agricultural
activities. 92 As a state agency, the Department remains subject to
93
general laws such as the Public Bid Law.
The legislature created the Louisiana Agricultural Finance
Authority in 1983 to respond to a shortage of capital needed to
drive agricultural development forward. 94 The Authority has nine
members. The Governor appoints eight of the members, and the
Commissioner of Agriculture and Forestry serves as the final
member. 95 The Finance Authority has the power to adopt
88. Id. at 102.
89. Id.
90. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 10.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38:2211 (2007).
Id.§ 3:262.
Id. § 3:264.
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regulations, authorize agricultural research, borrow money, and
issue bonds. 96 The Authority also has residual authority to "carry
out the purposes and provisions" of the act. 97 The Authority has a
broad purpose. The legislative findings state that the Authority
was created to "alleviate[] the severe shortage of capital . . .
available at affordable interest rates for investment in
agriculture." 98
The Authority's power to issue bonds for constructing
buildings for ultimate use by the Department of Agriculture and
Forestry convinced the court to conclude that the Commissioner
had not exceeded his authority. 99 However, the court's discussion
was not entirely candid. The opinion juxtaposes section 270 of the
Louisiana Finance Authority Act alongside section 266 without
clearly distinguishing them.' 00 Section 270 deals exclusively with
10
the agency's power to issue bonds to fund certain public works.
The quotation from section 266 is the same part of the statute
under dispute in the case. 1°2 The juxtaposition of the sections in
the opinion gives the impression that the court's conclusion is
founded on clear statutory language. In reality, the relationship of
the two statutes is not as clear.
The court recognized that its reasoning conflicted with the first
circuit's opinion in Associated General Contractorsof America v.
Police Jury of Pointe Point Coupee Parish.10 3 In Pointe Coupee,
the parish police jury was using the employees of the Department
of Highways to build roads without public bidding. 104 The first
circuit struck down the practice because it allowed public entities
to conspire to avoid complying with the Public Bid Law. 0 5 In the
Sugar Mill Case, the supreme court distinguished Pointe Coupee

96. Id.§ 3:266.
97. Id.
98. Id.§ 3:262.
99. La. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. La. Dep't of Agric. & Forestry (Sugar
Mill Case), 924 So. 2d. 90, 102-04 (La. 2006).
100. Id.at 102-03.
101. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3:270 (2007).
102. See id.§ 3:266.
103. 225 So. 2d 300 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
104. Id.at 303.
105. Id.at 306.
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on the grounds that the Department
of Agriculture and Forestry is
06
agency.'
parent
the Authority's
In the end, the court's structural analysis fails to confront the
hard issues. The Finance Authority is an independent agency. The
Commissioner maintains representation on that body as one of its
members. Through that membership, the Commissioner can
already wield influence over the Authority's decisions. To allow
the Commissioner to unilaterally borrow the Authority's
exemption vests him with the power to undertake all forms of
public works with Department capital provided that the project fits
within the court's broad statutory construction.
C. Cotton Candy
The Sugar Mill Case was decided by a comma. Language is a
useful tool for legal practitioners because it offers a degree of
predictability. Nevertheless, textual stability goes only so far. For
exceptionally unimportant problems, a textual approach may be an
expedient measure for conserving judicial effort. Problems in law
are seldom of such a variety.
To truly solve issues such as the ones in the Sugar Mill Case,
society would need to develop perfect laws to govern the meaning
of language. Unfortunately, that advancement will probably have
to wait until we can build machines that read minds. The court
was desperate to imbue the maze of words in section 266 with a
common sense meaning. But the approach failed to grapple with
the real issues. The Public Bid Law is about reining in favoritism
and wasteful public expenditures. The foundation of the law
cannot be ignored in favor of a cotton candy appeal to the plain
meaning of words.
III. FROM THE ROSETTA STONE
The "with or without public bidding" clause at the end of
section 266 of the Louisiana Agricultural Finance Act forms part
of a syntactical ambiguity that is very common in the English

106. La. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. La. Dep't of Agric. & Forestry (Sugar
Mill Case), 924 So. 2d 90, 103 n.17 (La. 2006).
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language. The following sections explore why the phrase is not as
clear as the Sugar Mill Case represents.
A. Development in Law and Literature
Anthropologists started to explore the problems of language in
the early twentieth century.' 0 7 Claude Levi-Strauss was one of the
first to posit a science of language. From his study of foreign
cultures, Strauss theorized that words are primarily rules of
negative relationships. Strauss's theory is commonly known as
structuralism. 108 Professor Ferdinand Saussure deserves credit for
structuralism's impact on linguistics. His lectures contain the
famous thought experiment illustrating the structuralist's concept
of language. 09 The word "tree" allows us to identify a class of
objectively identifiable external objects. Understanding of the
word derives from the ability to distinguish "trees" from
"bushes."' l0 The meaning of these two words in turn derives from
the fact that neither means "flowers.""' Structuralists might say
to Polonius's
that Hamlet was onto something when he responded
' "12
words!"
words,
"Words,
question by responding:
Of course, the vagueness inherent in the categorical structure of
language is nothing new to legal scholars. The literary theorists
who took up the exploration of text after Strauss and Saussure
were behind the learning curve.1 1 3 The two disciplines did,
however, experience something of a parallel development. Each

107. TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 85 (2d ed.
1996).
108. Id. at 90.
109. FERDINANDE DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 65. See
also id. at 110. My example is slightly modified from the one Saussure himself
describes.
110. SAUSSURE, supranote 109, at 66.
111. Id. at 67 (discussing the "arbitrary nature of the sign").
112. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1.
113. See FREDERICK A. PHILBRICK, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 28-29 (1951).
Philbrick discusses the difference between "concrete" and "abstract" words.
The analysis is conceptually similar to structuralism although Philbrick does not
couch the example in those terms. However, the example serves to show that
the avant-garde ideas that linguists would later refine were nevertheless budding
in legal intellectual circles.
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progressed from a rigidly formalist search for the intention of the
4
author to a system with some degree of atextual interpretivism.1
At a time when the law was thought to be a system of discrete
rules, Blackstone offered the well-known canons of construction to
solve the difficulties of ambiguous statutory language. Any
Louisiana legal scholar is familiar with these rules since our Civil
Code has codified a number of Blackstone's canons."15 The
canons have blended well with civilian notions of legislative
primacy. Article 9 is a testament to the marriage of the two
regimes: "When a law is clear and unambiguous ... the law shall
be applied as written and no further interpretation
may be made in
6
legislature.""
the
of
intent
the
of
search
The infamous difficulty of employing these rules to resolve
particular cases is well documented."'
It is perhaps an ironic
recognition of these difficulties that the legislature approved
methods that appear mutually exclusive at first blush--the socalled plain meaning rule and the teleological analysis. 1 18 The
common law ultimately outgrew its heavily formalist roots in
search of more powerful analytical tools. Law merged with
numerous other disciplines such as sociology, economics, and even
literature. " 9
The literary field deserves credit for developing the most
elaborate theories of interpretation. At the extreme, critics such as
Derrida had abandoned notions of stable meaning in text. 120 His
theory, popularly known as deconstruction, generated criticism
within the field that led some critics to denounce it as "licentious
or promiscuity. ',12
The legal community, in particular, has
114.

See generally EAGLETON, supra note 107. Eagleton treats the historic

developments in literature throughout the text.
115. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 9-13 (2007); Rodolfo Batiza,
Sources of the 1808 Civil Code, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 25 (1971).
116. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2007).
117. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
118. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 9-10 (2007).
119. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 90 (1995).
120.

See generally EAGLETON, supra note 107; see also POSNER, supra note

119, at 480, 492-93.
121. See TIMOTHY A.O. ENDIcOTr, VAGUENESS IN LAW 16 (2000) (quoting
David Gray Carlson defending deconstruction).
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122
struggled with the legitimacy of such an extreme approach.
Literature's insights into the semi-fluid nature of text nevertheless
have much to offer legal analysis.

B. The New Textualism
The flaw in the relativistic theories posited principally by
Derrida in the aftermath of the structuralist revolution was the
inability of the model to cope with the legitimacy of one context
over another. Derrida was unable to find a relationship between
the sign and the thing it signified. 123 No true meaning could be
The
made of the sentence, "Go through the light."
a
the
words
Are
deconstructionist fills its meaning with questions.
desperate plea? Does it imply something profound about the
afterlife? All readings are possible depending on the context. To
Derrida, the sentence simultaneously holds each possible meaning
since no preference for any particular context is possible within
deconstruction. 125 This impossibility arises from the limitless
perspectives available to observe the meaning. Should the author's
perspective control? Should an objective meaning prevail over a
subjective one? Derrida might say that these considerations are
beneath the text. For our purposes, the important question is
whether it is possible to reconcile the indisputable fluidity26of text
with an analytical framework that is not purely relativistic.'
122. Originalists, for example, reject the view that the Constitution of the
United States means anything other than what history says the founding fathers
Originalists believe this
POSNER, supra note 119, at 240.
intended.
methodology is essential to restrain the judiciary from imposing its own views
into the law. Id.at 241. This sentiment arising from a need in the legal
profession to present objective arguments to win cases has confounded the
assimilation of the more theoretical interpretive models. See id.at 243
(critiquing originalism). See also AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION
IN LAW 341 (Sari Bashi trans., 2005); STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY

AND LEGAL STUDIES

5 (1989).

123. See PETER V. ZIMA, DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICAL THEORY 168
(Rainer Emig trans., 2002); see generally Stanley E. Fish, A Reply to John
Reichert; Or, How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Interpretation, 6
CRITICAL INQUIRY 173 (1979).
124. See Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 629 (2005). The example is fully explored below.
125. ENDICOTT, supra note 121, at 15.
126. Fish, supra note 123, at 175.
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1. Stanley Fish-The Impossibility of Neutral Text
Stanley Fish proposed that the stabilizing link between text and
meaning is the observer's interpretive community. 27 He posits
that the text itself has no determinate meaning independent of the
act of reading.' 28 The text's "meaning" is created by the reader in
the process of reacting to syntax and context.129 Under this model,
meaning is limited by the words in the text but remains fluid in that
the interpretive strategies of
a particular community can
30
1
substance.
its
alter
powerfully
This fact of language does not mean that texts are worthless.
Prevailing wisdom as to the usefulness of texts simply needs reevaluation-especially in the field of law. Fish's theory of
interpretive communities, popularly known as "reader response
theory,"' 13 1 is helpful in this regard. Reader response theory
changes the focus of the inquiry of meaning from authors to
communities that share a basic level of uniform interpretive
strategies. 132 A crude example of an interpretive community
would be English speaking people.' 33 All English speakers share
common strategies that permit them to decode the words on this
page. 134 The important thing to note for this discussion is that an
127. See Stanley E. Fish, Interpreting the Variorum, 1

CRITICAL INQUIRY

465, 473-76 (1976) (exploring the issue in the context of John Milton's poetry).
128. Id.at 474.
129. See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 2 (1980); see also
Fish, supra note 127, at 475.
130. Fish, supranote 127, at 478. In his recent article, There Is No Textualist
Position, Fish connects the interpretive issues explored in his earlier works to
the legal field. Fish, supra note 124. In the article, Fish recounts his father
instructing him to "Go through the light" as he approaches a red light. Id.at
629. Fish then poses a simple question: "What did he mean?" Id. Fish
concludes that his father was not telling him to run the light but to pass through
the intersection when the light changes. Id. Fish looked beyond the "plain
meaning" of his father's words for the meaning his father "must have intended."
Id. Fish hypothesizes the same instruction in a number of contexts. Id. at 631.
He asks what the meaning would be if his father were experiencing chest pains
or enjoyed flouting authority. Id. Each new context demonstrates the
indeterminacy of the words themselves. "A sequence of letters and spaces,"
Fish says, "has no inherent or literal or plain meaning; it only has the meanings...
that emerge within the assumption of different intentions." Id. at 633.
131. See FISH, supra note 129, at 3.
132. Id.at 14.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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interpretive community can be very narrow. 135 This observation is
significant because the reader's interpretive community will
always come to bear on the meaning of words. 13 6 For this reason,
no text can be truly neutral. When two communities reach
different conclusions about the meaning of a particular text, a
mechanism to resolve the dispute is needed. So, the obvious
question is--should that mechanism be Blackstone's cannons?
2. In Defense of the Word-Sort of
As we have just seen, texts themselves cannot create or exclude
meaning without reference to the intentions of some human
being.
Given this critique, we must ask if the legal community
should abandon text all together. The answer to that question is
obviously no. The community of legal interpreters is sufficiently
stable to sustain the continued utility of text. If nothing else,
texts--whether cases or statutes--are the point from which other
non-textual legal arguments ultimately emerge. Another example
taken from the pages of an article by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
helps to illustrate.
The article supposes that lightning
a tree leaving a
,, strikes
,,138
pattern that appears to be the word "STOP.
People start to treat
the tree as a stop sign.' 39 One day, a driver drives past without
stopping and collides with another car. 140 The court holds the
driver liable for negligence. 14 1 The decision of the court in
Sinnott-Armstrong's hypothetical has nothing to do with the
meaning of the lightning strike pattern. 42 The driver is deemed
negligent because he breached the expectations that had arisen in
the community. 143 To this extent, the pattern on the tree serves as

135. Id.
136. Fish, supra note 124, at 641-42.
137. Id.at641.
138. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Word Meaning in Legal Interpretation,42
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 465, 474 (2005). See Fish, supra note 124, at 640-43
(analyzing this example at length in his own article).
139. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 138.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 475.
143. See id
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a useful text since it identifies the governing standard of
behavior. 144

This accommodation for text should not be taken as a
validation of plain meaning. The analysis in previous sections
conclusively demonstrates that plain meaning simply does not
exist. All supposedly literal interpretations of text amount to little
more than shorthand for numerous assumptions and value
judgments related to social life. 14 If the plain meaning rule has
any utility, the utility does not derive from any substantive source.
The rule's benefit is probably limited to an economizing function
for issues that enjoy virtual unanimous consensus. 146 It would be
nonsensical, for example, to ask the courts to explain the policies
surrounding speed limits to everyone who gets a ticket because
everyone implicitly understands that speed limits are a tax on
driving at excessive speeds.
But many laws grapple with
behavioral issues that are far more complex than speeding. In
these cases, competing interpretations often arise, and the court
must go beyond the text to reach a resolution.

IV. BEYOND THE MILL
If the text offers no dispositive solution to the sugar mill
problem, what does? The answer begins with a simple tenet: Law
strives to create the best vision of social life. This section posits
the alternative visions of social life that emerge under different
interpretations of the Public Bid Law. This part evaluates these
alternatives and explores possible legislative responses.
A. Did the Court Get it Wrong?
The court set out to answer an ostensibly simple question in the
Sugar Mill Case: Does "with or without public bidding" apply to
144. See id. In other words, the fake "stop sign" tells us to apply the law of
torts and that the standard of liability is negligence because running stop signs is
considered an imprudent thing to do by most people. Law adopts this analysis
to vindicate other interests, such as fairness, rather than to discern the "true
meaning" of the text. See Fish, supranote 124, at 641-42.
145. See Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 138, at 475; Fish, supra note 124, at
642.
146. See POSNER, supra note 119, at 399.
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all powers listed in the paragraph or to only a few of them? The
preceding sections lay out why the court's conclusion was
unfounded as a matter of linguistics-not as a matter of law.
There is nothing more to gain from studying the statute's syntax.
The rest is beyond the text.
The issue in the Sugar Mill Case is institutional. The public
does not have the time to keep a close eye on every public official.
In some cases, public servants are unaccountable because they are
insulated from the political process. As we have discussed,
competitive bidding laws solve this problem in the public works
context by limiting the government's discretion. Whether the court
was right depends on whether the transfer of the bidding
exemption to the Commissioner and the Department poses no
additional risk that competitive bidding would resolve.
On this point, the court's decision was wrong. The architecture
of these institutions reveals relationships that pose a high risk of
corruption.
As the court acknowledges, the Executive
Reorganization Act gives the Commissioner tremendous influence
over the Finance Authority's eight Governor-appointed board
members. 147 True pluralism on an eight member board could
justify an exemption from the Public Bid Law on the theory that
the members would check one another.
But since the
Commissioner of Agriculture and Forestry sits as the ninth
48
member of the board, the risk of collusion rises dramatically.
The Commissioner's influence over the Finance Authority's board
is further augmented by virtue of his power to appoint
all of the
49
Authority's employees and to enforce its decisions.
The Executive Reorganization Act and the Louisiana
Agricultural Finance Act concentrate considerable power over the
board in the hands of the Agriculture Commissioner. The risk of
corruption this influence poses cannot be understated.
The
political clout of Commissioner Odom is renowned.' 50 After the
147. La. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. La. Dep't of Agric. & Forestry (Sugar
Mill Case), 924 So. 2d 90, 102 (La. 2006). See also Executive Reorganization
Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36:621-29 (2006); Louisiana Agricultural Finance
Act, id §§ 3:261-83.
148. § 3:265.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Laura Maggi, Syrup Mill Plan Lures Private Investors, TIMES
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 21 2006, National, at 2.
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decision in the Sugar Mill Case, the Commissioner pressed for
construction of another mill in Bunkie.' 5 1 The Commissioner
pushed for the project despite an independent feasibility study that
concluded the mill would "collapse under the weight of its own
debt within a decade.' ' 152 The project would have gone forward
were it not for the intervention
of Governor Kathleen Blanco who
1 53
crushed the proposal.
If allowed to stand, the Sugar Mill Case could allow public
officials to order needless construction projects to benefit political
supporters. Officials might be able to ensure re-election by letting
constituents sell supplies to the government for exorbitant prices.
If the legislature adopted the Public Bid Law to end these
perversities, the court should have adopted the Contractors'
restrictive interpretation. On the other hand, if there is a political
subtext, another horrifying possibility remains.
B. Did the Court Get it Right?
Louisiana is not the only state famous for corruption. In 1898,
Hackfeld & Co. was one of the big five sugar producers in
Hawaii.154 The United States seized the assets of the Germanowned sugar behemoth in World War 1.155 After the war, Congress
returned seized property to American citizens who were living
abroad during the war.1
The former stockholders of Hackfeld &
Co. bribed public officials and perpetrated elaborate perjuries to
obtain recognition of their U.S. citizenship. 157 After the fraud
came out in the stockholder's suit, the success of the fraud was
staggering.15 8 59The subterfuge fooled even the President of the
United States.'
151. Id.
152. Michelle Millhollon, Syrup Plans Get Sour Review, THE ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge), Apr. 16, 2005, at B 1.
153. Michelle Millhollon, Panel Rejects Syrup Plant,THE ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge), Dec. 1, 2006, at Al.
154. Frederick Bemays Wiener, German Sugar's Sticky Fingers, 16 HAw. J.
HIST. 15, 16 (1982).
155. Id.at 19.
156. Id.at 20-22.
157. For a more thorough account of the fraud, see generally id.
158. Id.
159. Id.at 23.
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While I do not intend to suggest the sugar mill controversy
involved anything so lurid, Hackfeld illustrates the dangers of
greed. If the legislature intended to give the Finance Authority an
exemption, the court's interpretation would be the correct one, but
not for any of the reasons advanced in the opinion. Two policies
could plausibly justify the legislature's motives.
1. Risk Management and Special Needs
A possibility is that the Finance Authority and Department of
Agriculture and Forestry engage in public works activities
associated with a low risk of pocket padding, or activities that have
special needs. The exemption for public works under $100,000 is
an example of the former. Capital costs make under-the-counter
deals in low price ranges less attractive. The incentive to engage
in deals with which the Public Bid Law is concerned with is likely
to become a serious problem only when the profit margins are
sufficiently high. Additionally, the cost of implementing the
Public Bid Law's procedures-in particular advertising--may
offset the savings derived from requiring them on small projects.
An example of the second variety of exemption arises in the
context of transactions with the federal government."' State and
federal governments depend on each other to provide a number of
public services from defense to infrastructure. Federal, state, and
constitutional law are the foundation of the relationship. The
legislature could have found the state bidding laws ill-suited to
remedy the unique problems that arise in the course of federal-state
transactions.
Neither of these policies support the expansive decision
reached in the Sugar Mill Case. If the court had adopted a narrow
interpretation-finding an exemption only if the Authority
disposes of property-a low-risk policy could support the
exemption. The legislature could have found mandatory bidding
unnecessary if competitive bidding was already the custom in sales
transactions. This finding does not need to deny the possibility
that some officials might pass off cheap farm equipment to
160. See La. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. La. Dep't of Agric. & Forestry
(SugarMill Case), 924 So. 2d 90, 100 n.15 (La. 2006).
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political allies. If the incidents of pocket padding are sufficiently
low in sales transactions, the legislature could have found that the
cost of preventing the transactions offsets the potential gain.
Permitting the Department of Agriculture and Forestry to
borrow an exemption to build expensive agricultural facilities is
hardly consistent with these findings without the appropriate
findings of fact. While the Department did argue that they were
saving the state money, the courts never passed judgment on this
claim. 161
2. CondoningPocket Padding
In the course of its analysis, the court notes that Senator James
David Cain proposed a bill to amend the Public Bid Law to require
162
compliance from the Department of Agriculture and Forestry.
The bill ultimately failed to receive enough votes to pass into
law. 163 The bill's failure could mean that the legislature is not only
aware of the problems in the Department of Agriculture and
Forestry, but also approves of its practices.
The legislature could find utility in permitting the
Commissioner to pay his employees more than their skills would
be worth in the private sector. Voters who benefit from higher pay
in exchange for doing extra work for the Department would be
incensed if their elected officials ended the field trip through the
taxpayer's candy shop. If so, the court's decision carries out the
will of the legislature.
If such a lurid policy lurks beneath the exemption, it cannot
justify the court's interpretation. The judiciary has a duty to apply
the law to reach the best results for society. The public hires
judges to perform an impartial arbitration function. When the
government compensates workers at a level inconsistent with their
true value, mid-income individuals and businesses without political
clout to protect their interest bear the burden. Courts should
provide remedies in these cases. Upholding one-sided schemes in
161. Reply Brief on Behalf of Louisiana Associated General Contractors,
Inc., at 14, Sugar Mill Case, 924 So. 2d 90 (No. 2003-CA-2501).

162. Sugar Mill Case, 924 So. 2d at 99 n.10; see also Lawmaker Wants
(BATON ROUGE), Apr. 2, 2005, at

Odom to Follow Public-BidLaw, ADVOCATE
A12.

163. Sugar Mill Case, 924 So. 2d at 99 n.10.
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the name of obeying the will of the legislature sanctions economic
stagnation, promotes waste, and diminishes the wealth of the
people. 164
C. Closing the Candy Store
The decision in the Sugar Mill Case was misguided. Our
supreme court was no doubt seeking the most appropriate result
under the law. Plain meaning failed to deliver that result. The
decision concentrated an immense amount of power in the hands of
the Agriculture Commissioner to undertake wasteful public works
contrary to the public interest. If the law permits agencies to loan
bidding exemptions to their parent departments, the holding in the
Sugar Mill Case threatens to spread.
The Sugar Mill Case sets a precedent for exemption lending.
Paragraph 15 of section 600.6 of the Louisiana Housing Finance
Act is identical to the statute that the court held exempts the
Agricultural Finance Authority.' 65 The structure of the agency is
also very similar. The Housing Authority is a sub-agency of the
Department of Treasury 16 6 The treasury secretary sits on the
board of the Authority.
The Governor appoints the remaining
members.
Under the holding of the Sugar Mill Case, the
Department of Treasury can build multi-million dollar offices
without public bidding through the Louisiana Housing
Authority. 69 Louisiana Associated General Contractors warned
the court of this possibility
in its brief, but the issue only received
70
mention in a footnote.'
The remedy now lies in the hands of the legislature. The
Public Bid Law needs a comprehensive amendment to rein in the
results of the Sugar Mill Case, and to centralize the various

164.

See LAGC Original Brief, supra note 68, at 17.

165. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:600.6(A)(15) (2007).
166. Id. § 40:600.3.
167. Id. § 40:600.4.
168. Id.
169. See LAGC Original Brief, supra note 68, at 18-19.
170. La. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. La. Dep't of Agric. & Forestry (Sugar
Mill Case), 924 So. 2d 90, 100 n.1 1 (La. 2006); see also LAGC Original Brief,
supra note 68, at 18-19.
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At a minimum, the amendment

1. Codify the Exemptions
One section should list all of the exemptions to the Public Bid
Law. No exemptions should be permitted except as provided in
this section. This change would prevent the problems that arise
from piecemeal exceptions and prevent legislators from hiding
exemptions for pet projects, which appear throughout
legislation. 17 1 The legislature should also craft the exemptions
with greater care so that the scope of the exemptions is more
clearly defined.
2. Abolish Inter-Agency Exemption Borrowing
The legislature should abolish the power of state departments
to use exemptions in favor of its agencies to carry out department
projects. The risk of individual public officials influencing the
members of the agency's board with political clout is high.
Forcing department officials to rely solely on the resources of the
subsidiary agency to avoid the Public Bid Law insulates the
process from self-dealing.
These solutions are not comprehensive in scope. To ensure the
proper use of public funding, the legislature should seek to
implement cost-effective procedures to ensure the integrity of the
public trust. The controversy surrounding the Sugar Mill Case
By
proves that appropriate safeguards are still lacking.
implementing the strategies above, the legislature would move the
law in the correct direction.
V.

SWEET AND SOUR

After the Agriculture Commissioner's conflict with the
Governor over the Bunkie syrup mill, the days of 45 million dollar
blockbuster construction contracts could end. The sugar mill
171. For example, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 3:4274.2 exempts the
"taking of mayhaw berries" from the Public Bid Law. Obscure exceptions such
as these tucked away in other parts of the Revised Statues could seriously
jeopardize the Public Bid Law's protections.
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debacle nevertheless casts a troubling shadow over the viability of
the Public Bid Law. If the court continues to view exemptions
expansively and allow liberal inter-agency borrowing, public
entities with the greatest need for oversight could remain
unchecked. The court should not have rendered a decision with
such profound consequences in the name of following the letter of
the law. To move forward, state representatives should revisit the
Public Bid Law to reinforce its procedures and enhance its
protection.
Louis Ducote*

* I would like to send my deepest regards to Judge Melvin A. Shortess
(ret.) and Professor Kenneth M. Murchison for their guidance and assistance
with this note. Without them, this note would not have been possible.

